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Introduction
This paper discusses the application of  computer modeling (i.e., 
modeling in  silico) to philosophical problems, especially ethical ones. 
Computer modeling has become a generally accepted method for rese-
arching, testing, and validating scientific theories, engineering models, 
and real-life scenarios and models (denoted as simulations)1 in nume-
rous technological and scientific fields.2 Indeed, in  silico methods are 
much cheaper and safer to implement than actual real-life studies. What 
is more, some studies are not possible without such methods because 
of  their complexity or possible negative effects. In silico modeling has 
opened up new research venues, but it also has brought forward fresh 
epistemic challenges about how to build the “right” models and how 
to interpret the results of these studies.3
The idea of using mathematics (i.e., mathematical methods in gene-
ral, of which computers are just one form) as a philosophical method 
predates the advent of  computer systems. A  prominent example of 
this approach is  Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of  Natural 
Philosophy,4 where he formulated a general description of the physical 
world (which was conceived as a philosophical theory) in the language 
of mathematics. Thus, for Newton, mathematics served as a  language 
to describe philosophical concepts. In the first half of the 20th century, 
 1 Simulation (sometimes called computer-based simulation) in this context denotes the use 
of computer-based models to investigate the properties of physical, social, or other phenomena that 
can be represented meaningfully in computer symbolism. The computer models used in such simu-
lations are mathematical abstractions, so their results only approximate the properties of the mod-
eled objects. The relation between the simulated phenomenon and the simulation itself is called the 
epistemic distance between a computer model and the reality it represents.
 2 See, for example P. Thagard, Computational Models in Science and Philosophy, in: Introduction 
to Formal Philosophy, eds. S. O. Hansson, V. F. Hendricks, Cham 2018, p. 457–467, doi: 10.1007/978-
3-319-77434-3_24; E. Winsberg, Computer Simulation and the Philosophy of Science, “Philosophy 
Compass” 4 (2009) no. 5, p. 835–845, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00236.x.
 3 E. Winsberg, Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation, “Science in Context” 
12 (1999) no. 2, p. 275–292, doi: 10.1017/S0269889700003422.
 4 I. Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Londini 1687.
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the deductive structures of formal logic were used to analyze classical 
concepts of philosophy.5 Later, in the latter half of  that century, diffe-
rent mathematical structures were used for the same type of philosop-
hical analysis. For example, Raine and Heller applied the mathematical 
concept of  differentiable manifold to  analyze the properties of  space- 
-time structures and correct some interpretations of classical concepts 
for dynamics (e.g., the dynamics of Aristotle, Newton, and Special and 
 General Relativity).6
The obvious question is  then whether computational modeling, 
or in silico methods, could be useful for philosophy beyond the study 
of formal methods.7 It seems that as computational modeling, or in sil-
ico, studies in science serve as an extension of the methodology of phi-
losophy in  science (Heller’s methodology), adopting them in  other 
 areas of philosophy would only be a natural extension.8
So far, little work has applied in silico methods to classical and mod-
ern philosophical questions. The likely reason for this is that philoso-
phy is often regarded as a mental exercise in  theory with little or no 
practical import, so it does not lend itself to algorithmic, digital meth-
ods for in  silico studies, excluding of  course purely formal studies 
 5 See, for example J. Salamucha, Dowód “ex motu” na istnienie Boga. Analiza logiczna argumen-
tacji św. Tomasza z Akwinu, “Collectanea Theologica” 54 (1934) no. 1–2, p. 53–92; English transla-
tion: J. Salamucha, The proof “ex motu” for the existence of God. Logical analysis of St. Thomas’ ar-
guments, “The New Scholasticism” 32 (1958), p. 327–372; Salamucha’s analysis could be conceived 
as fruitful for philosophical research, because it inspired formalization of the concept of change, see, 
for example, L. Larouche, Examination of the axiomatic foundations of a theory of change I, “Notre 
Dame Journal of Formal Logic” 9 (1968) no. 4, p. 371–384.
 6 D. J. Raine, M. Heller, The Science of Space-Time, Tucson, AZ 1981, p. 240; M. Heller, Evolution 
of space-time structures, “Concepts of Physics” 3 (2006), p. 117–131; M. Heller, How is philosophy in sci-
ence possible?, “Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)” 2019 no. 66, 
p. 231–249; P. Polak, Philosophy in science: A name with a long intellectual tradition, “Philosophical 
Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)” 2019 no. 66, p. 251–270.
 7 See, for example, P. Thagard, Computational Models in Science and Philosophy…, dz. cyt., 
passim.
 8 See, for example, A. Sloman, The Computer Revolution in Philosophy: Philosophy, Science, 
and Models of Mind, Atlantic Highlands, NJ 1978, passim; J. Vallverdú, Thinking Machines and the 
Philosophy of Computer Science: Concepts and Principles, Hershey, PA 2010, passim.
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in  ontology, logic, or  linguistics. However, with philosophy working 
on  the problems of  representing the mind, the simulation of  cogni-
tive functions, and the modeling of ethical situations (e.g., the trolley 
problem and game theory), in silico methods may become a part of the 
philosophical toolbox. In addition, experimental philosophy or meth-
ods, such as  reflective equilibrium9 or  conceptual analysis,10 seem 
to  be almost begging to  be explored with the aid of  computational 
methods.
Interesting studies into the computational modeling of philosoph-
ical problems have been undertaken in Kraków, namely in  the work 
of Robert Janusz SI at the Vatican Observatory and Copernicus Center 
for Interdisciplinary Studies. Robert Janusz proposed using the object- 
-oriented programming paradigm to  model classical metaphysical11 
concepts and psycho-ethical12 relations and formalize the concept of   
analogy.13
The study presented here investigates an application of the in sil-
ico method to the modeling of robotic ethics based on the concept 
of phronesis. Specifically, we wish to  investigate whether in  silico 
models can deliver a philosophical analysis of the phronetic ethics 
implemented in autonomous robots, determine how ethical research 
into autonomous robotic ethics may benefit from in  silico meth-
ods, and establish how our understanding of ethics could benefit 
 9 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge 1971, passim.
 10 M. Beaney, Analysis, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), 
ed. E. N. Zalta, Stanford 2018, https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2018/entries/ 
analysis/.
 11 R. Janusz, Program dla Wszechświata: filozoficzne aspekty języków obiektowych, Kraków 2002, 
passim; another interesting formalization of Leibniz’s metaphysical concepts was done by Jarosław 
Strzelecki, see J. Strzelecki, Monada = Monada() – interpretacja obiektowa, in: Filozofia i technika, 
red. J. Sobota, G. Pacewicz, Olsztyn 2017, p. 35–52.
 12 R. Janusz, Relacja etyczno-psychologiczna w ujęciu obiektowym, in: Philosophiae & musicae: 
księga pamiątkowa z okazji jubileuszu 75-lecia urodzin księdza profesora Stanisława Ziemiańskiego SJ, 
red. R. Darowski, Kraków 2006, p. 375–380.
 13 R. Janusz, O metodach wirtualnych w paradygmacie obiektowym, “Zagadnienia Filozoficzne 
w Nauce” (2007) no. 41, p. 125–131.
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from in silico studies. The field of robotic ethics seems particularly 
well suited to in silico methodology because it requires, on the one 
hand, a deep understanding of ethical issues that are always regard-
ed as controversial and poorly articulated, while on the other hand, 
robotic ethics needs a very meticulous verification of computerized 
ethical solutions in real-life scenarios. The clarification and disam-
biguation of ethical concepts and the large-scale verification (im-
plying a multitude of complex testing scenarios) of ethical solutions 
are some areas of ethical robotics where in silico methods may prove 
indispensable.
What is robotic ethics?
Ethics in autonomous robots (a-robots) is implemented in an ab-
stract computational model of the Turing Machine (TM). Such a-robots 
can only be behavioral systems.14 They are ethical zombies,15 because 
TMs only implement behavioral features without the associated mental 
capacities.16 The behavioral approach to morality has been long disa-
vowed, however. Thus, if our aspiration is to have a-robots with human- 
-like ethics, we  could say that a-robots implement the wrong ethi-
cal model in the wrong computational paradigm. Of course, this may 
seem like a gross oversimplification of the research into ethical robotics. 
 14 Contemporary psychology and philosophy largely share Hempel’s conviction that any ex-
planation of behavior cannot omit invoking a creature’s representation of its world: “Psychology 
must use psychological terms. Behavior without cognition is blind. Psychological theorizing with-
out reference to internal cognitive processing is explanatorily impaired” (C. G. Hempel, Philosophy 
of Natural Science, Prentice-Hall 1966).
 15 The TM paradigm limits the ethical capacities of TM-based systems. It would seem than 
that any extension to the TM model—such as non-deterministic TMs (NDTMs), c-machines, and 
o-machines—would not change the essence of the paradigm (i.e., eliminate its limitations regard-
ing ethical capacities). See J. R. Searle, Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World, 
New York 1998, passim.
 16 Behavior can be described and explained without making ultimate reference to mental events 
or internal psychological processes. The sources of behavior are external (i.e., in the environment) 
rather than internal (i.e., in the mind).
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However, on close scrutiny, the various computerized ethics implement-
ing emotional rules, virtues, and mixtures of deterministic and prob-
abilistic algorithms (see later in the text) seem to be variations on the 
same theme.17 When a-robots enter our social environment, we need 
them to think and make decisions like we do and share our social norms 
and values,18 so we can accept them as social partners, particularly if we 
plan19 to grant them some of our rights!20 A-robots need human-like 
 ethics rather than zombie-like one.
Autonomous robots with ethical capacities (e-robots) have access 
to facts (i.e., information about the current environment at a given time), 
past ethical decisions, and past outcomes on an incomparably larger 
scale than we humans do. In addition, e-robots could potentially have 
vastly more powerful inference capacities than us. Yet so far, despite all 
the available computational power and past and present data, no robots 
have demonstrated superior ethics and better ethical decision-making 
than us humans, even if we do err so often!
 17 See M.  Anderson, S.  L. Anderson, Machine Ethics, Cambridge 2011; M.  Anderson, 
S. L. Anderson, GenEth: General Ethical Dilemma Analyzer, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth 
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Québec 2014, p. 253–261; L. Floridi, J. W. Sanders, On the 
morality of artificial agents, “Minds and Machines” 14 (2004) no. 3, p. 349–379, doi: 10.1023/B:MIN
D.0000035461.63578.9d; W. Wallach, C. Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, 
Oxford 2009; W. Wallach, S. Franklin, C. Allen, A conceptual and computational model of moral de-
cision making in human and artificial agents, “Topics in Cognitive Science” 2 (2010) no. 3, p. 454–
485, doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01095.x.
 18 See R. van Oers, E. Wesselman, Social Robots, in: KPMG Advisory 2016; I. Leite, C. Martinho, 
A. Paiva, Social Robots for Long-Term Interaction: A Survey, “International Journal of Social Robotics” 
5 (2013) no. 2, p. 291–308, doi: 10.1007/s12369-013-0178-y.
 19 „Creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisti-
cated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons responsible 
for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases 
where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently” 
(European Parliament, Civil Law Rules on Robotics European Parliament resolution of 16 February 
2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), 
Rule 56.f., https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0051_EN.html).
 20 F. Alaieri, A. Vellino, Ethical decision making in robots: Autonomy, trust and responsibility, 
in: Social Robotics, eds. A. Agah et al., vol. 9979, Cham 2016, p. 159–168, doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-
47437-3_16.
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We make the claim that a critical, although not the only, difference 
in  ethics between a-robots and humans is  in the “inference/ascend 
method.” In other words, this is a way of ascending to an ethical de-
cision based on the facts present, the objectives of an action, and past 
experiences and their outcomes. Thus, to improve the moral capacities 
of  a-robots, we need to change the way we “compute” ethical decisions. 
In other words, we need a paradigm shift in “roboethics.” The new model 
that we propose is based on the Aristotelian concept of phronesis.21
What are phronetic robotic ethics?
What is phronesis or ethical wisdom? Phronesis, according to Ar-
istotle, is not an exact science (like episteme in the Aristotelian sense) 
or art (like techne, craft or practical skills). Unlike exact sciences, it is 
not based on ultimate (necessary) principles.22 The general principles 
of an exact science (for Aristotle) are “absolute,” because they express 
abstract, nominal truths. Ethics, meanwhile, deal with “enmattered 
things” and with the changeability and variability inherent in concrete 
embodied facts. The objective of  phronesis is  therefore eudaimonia, 
a realization of a specific concept of good for a person (or actor). The 
focus of phronesis is the difference presented by a specific case from 
ultimate principles rather than its fit with “general” rules.23 Phrone-
sis cannot be taught like mathematics, for example, because there are 
no rules to teach in phronesis.24 Phronetic expertise can only be gained 
through direct experience.
 21 P. Polak, R. Krzanowski, Phronetic ethics in social robotics: A new approach to building ethi-
cal robots, (2019), doi: 10.13140/rg.2.2.16802.79049.
 22 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.  A. K.  Thomson, London–New York 2004; 
C. D. C. Reeve, Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford 1992.
 23 “The decision in this case is not from universal principles to the case but from the case to the 
universal principles (arguing to the first principles [101a37-b4], not from the first principles, as  exact 
sciences do)” (J. H. Randall, Aristotle, New York 1965, p. 267).
 24 I.e., ethics is not Euclidian geometry.
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We will not provide a detailed explanation of what phronesis is, be-
cause others have done this for some time already.25 However, we will 
summarize the principles informing phronetic decisions:
1. Phronetic ascend cannot be encapsulated in a set of rules, because 
it deals with the specificity of particular cases (i.e., it is not procedural).
2. Phronetic ascend is case-specific (i.e., the focus of the phronetic 
decision is a particular case).
3. The decision for the specific case is not achieved through logical 
analysis (which originally meant Aristotelian logic) or reasoning through 
principles (like in science) but rather through intuitively grasping the 
outcome or having “foresight of consequences.”
The challenge faced by philosophers and computer scientists is to find 
a way to translate these principles into a robotic decision-making system. 
This is at the junction where philosophical analysis and in silico methods 
come to meet and interact.
Phronesis seems to be at  the nexus of personal ethical sensitivity, 
intuition, experience, and ethical wisdom accumulated through indi-
vidual and community experiences, whether communicated implicitly 
or explicitly through social interactions. How much of this complex col-
lection of ideas, experiences, and unwritten rules may be translated into 
logic, and therefore programmed, is obviously a challenge to establish.
What can in silico models offer robotic ethics research?
There are several aspects of  roboethic research, and specifically 
 phronetic roboethics, to which in silico studies may be helpful. The many 
aspects of phronetic ethics, and ethics in general, have always been am-
biguous and poorly understood. These include the problem of ethical 
ascend, the problem of ethical choice, the meaning of the telos of eth-
ics (the ultimate goal of ethics) and eudaimonia (the best good), the 
problem of generalizing ethical cases, and the problem of learning from 
 25 J. H. Randall, Aristotle…, op. cit. passim; C. D. C. Reeve, Practices of Reason…, op. cit., passim.
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experience what information is relevant to  the ethical context, so we 
know what to retain and what to discard.
We may wonder how in silico studies may help. An in silico envi-
ronment (as a computer model) requires a precise definition of terms, 
dependencies, and methods. In silico models will not accept poorly de-
fined concepts, unclear specifications, or simple hand waving for the 
difficult aspects of a problem, all of which may appear in philosophical 
works and work on ethics (including ethics in robotics). While some 
philosophical problems cannot, by virtue of  their nature, be exactly 
translated into an in silico environment (e.g., intuitions, moral values, 
hopes, and preferences), the effort to translate them into some com-
puter-compatible form obliges researchers to perform a very detailed 
analysis of concepts and clarify the ideas. This mandatory specificity 
and clarity for the problem sometimes requires a more complex and 
accurate study than a typical conceptual analysis of analytic philoso-
phy would demand. Questions about ethical ascend, intuition, deci-
sion-making in complex scenarios, and the important aspects of a case 
all have to be laid down in detail.
Creating a physical model of an autonomous robot and then experi-
menting with its capacities in a real environment is very costly, imprac-
tical, and possibly even dangerous. It  is much safer to test such a ro-
bot in a virtual environment (i.e., in silico) using virtual scenarios. This 
is cheaper, faster, and operationally more efficient. In silico models can 
test more complex scenarios, expose the in silico ethical system to a much 
larger spectrum of situations,26 and do it much faster. Table 1 presents the 
principles of phronesis, roboethics, and their implications for in silico 
studies.
 26 It is much cheaper and safer to teach pilots on airplane simulators than on real airplanes. 
Engineers also understand this already.
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Table 1. Proposed interpretation Phronesis, roboethics, and in silico methods
Phronesis Roboethics In silico modeling
Ethics is not an exact science, 
so one cannot define general-
ized universal rules to guide be-
havior. (i.e., decisions are taken 
in particular cases, but general 
rules are always generalizations 
[sic], so they will sometimes 
be wrong in particular cases.)
This implies that the devel-
opment of algorithmic rules 
to solve ethical problems will 







Ethical decisions are all case- 
-specific and guided by the 
weight of experience.
This means that phronetic ca-
pacities are not “programmed” 
a priori but learned.
Learning from experi-
ence, formalizing ethical 
ascend, and testing and 
verifying ethical rules 
on a large scale
Ethical decisions always 
go from the specific case to the 
universal principle, not from 
the universal principle to the 
specific case.
This means that the focus of an 
ethical decision is the ethical as-
pect of the specific case rather 




The telos of ethics (the ultimate 
goal of ethics) is eudaimonia 
(the best good).
The telos of ethical decisions (in 
the case of a-robots) is the best 
good of the human actors in-
volved, not the a-robots them-
selves. Other formulations 





It may seem that in  silico studies—while applicable to  problems 
in  science, technology, and mathematics—are of  no import to  philo-
sophical research. This is  a  rather incomplete and dated perspective, 
however. With philosophy tackling increasingly more practical prob-
lems, in silico modeling may become an accepted philosophical meth-
odology. From the clarification of  ideas, through detailed conceptual 
analysis and the verification of  proposed concepts, in  silico modeling 
may enhance and enrich philosophical study. What is more, let us also 
remember that there is a mutual dependency between in silico modeling 
and philosophy.
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In this study, we show how certain aspects of robotic ethics could 
benefit from the application of  in silico methodology. Implementing 
phronetic ethics in autonomous machines would force a deep concep-
tual analysis of Aristotelian ethics. Several aspects of such ethics cannot 
be easily formalized, so we need to reformulate and rethink some aspects 
of phronetic ethics before we can use them in non-human ethical agents. 
This leads to new philosophical questions and problems and opens the 
way for new discussions about classical concepts. For example we may 
ask the question, what are the properties of a human actor as an ethical 
agent in Aristotelian ethics, and why are they unique?
A review of Aristotelian ethics reveals hidden premises that are 
implicitly assumed to  be self-evident for a  human ethical agent. 
Extending ethical agency to  include autonomous systems, howev-
er, makes most of these assumptions problematic, so they need re-
framing. By explicating these tacit assumptions hidden within the 
classical concepts, we deepen the analysis of classical knowledge, 
leading not just to new solutions but also a better understanding 
of  the old ideas. The analysis imposed by  in silico methodology 
also gives us  also a  new philosophical perspective on  the differ-
ences between humans and animals, humans and autonomous ro-
bots, and animals and autonomous robots. Attempts to  formalize 
and implement phronetic ethics could also reveal fundamental 
connections between distant regions of philosophical thought (e.g., 
the role of  semiotics in ethics). Phronetic roboethics and in  silico 
methodology force the philosopher to clarify the problem of eth-
ical ascend, elucidate the issue of ethical choice, and explicate the 
meaning of  the telos of ethics (the ultimate goal of ethics). In sili-
co studies force us  to define the problems of  generalizing ethical 
cases and learning from experience, as  well as  how to  determine 
what information is ethically relevant to retain and what can be dis-
carded, which in  in silico terms is  called information reduction. 
The in silico approach to ethical problems has also some heuristic 
potential, because it  encourages new research into classical con-
cepts. For example, the need to  adapt Aristotle’s ethics suggests 
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that some fundamental concepts, such as  eudaimonia, could be   
generalized.27 Computational modeling in ethics also brings possi-
bilities for the quasi-empirical testing of hybrid ethical concepts, like 
in Weronika Wojtanowska’s proposition of enrichment for Thomas 
Nagel’s ethics through some elements of virtue ethics.28 A question 
remains, however: Would an  ethical robot, even with some form 
of phronesis, display the normal range of human cognitive faculties, 
or would it display some of the symptoms that characterize disor-
ders like autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and other dysfunctions? 
We are not entirely sure what causes these disorders in human sub-
jects, so  while programming robots, we  could inadvertently cre-
ate dysfunctional artificial minds. In short, we claim that in  silico 
methodology for ethical research in robotics will open up new areas 
of discussion around the limits of machine ethics.
Ethical issues, including those of Aristotle’s phronesis, always present 
an intellectual challenge and are therefore fertile grounds for deep phil-
osophical studies, but they are usually lacking in praxis. The disconnect 
between the theoretical and practical, for an acute mind, is one of the 
great paradoxes of Aristotelian ethics. The philosophy of ethical thought 
as a practical philosophy has never produced clear and unambiguous 
practical solutions and guidelines. Is this a nature of the problem? Or is 
there an intellectual weakness from our side? In silico studies may help 
answer this question.
Now, we need to ask whether we should leave the concepts of phro-
nesis, ethical ascend, and related issues as  vague and undefined 
as they are in Aristole’s ethics, or could we, benefit from actually ap-
plying them to quasi-real-life (i.e., virtual) scenarios through in silico 
 27 For example, the issue of generalizing the concept of eudaimonia was analyzed by Weronika 
Wojtanowska in her book Próba rozwinięcia filozofii moralnej Thomasa Nagela o elementy etyki cnót 
(forthcoming). Wojtanowska started by analyzing Thomas Nagel’s concept and tried to develop this 
abstract idea, but the value of this philosophical consideration was unclear until it was applied in an 
in silico approach.
 28 W. Wojtanowska, Próba rozwinięcia filozofii moralnej Thomasa Nagela o elementy etyki cnót 
[to be published], Kraków 2020.
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methods. After all, the confrontation with reality (or “trial by fire,” 
although in our case, the fire is virtual) was something that Aristote-
lian ideas were originally designed to face. Will philosophy be open 
to new approaches, or will it choose to limit itself to the theoretical 
study of ideas, afraid of being confronted with reality, even if it is only 
a reality in silico?
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Abstrakt
Implementacja etyki autonomicznych robotów  
jako przykład filozofii in silico:  
Studium przypadku fronetycznej etyki maszyn
W artykule przestawiono zastosowanie narzędzi informatycznych do modelowania 
koncepcji etycznych. Komputerowe modelowanie nazywane jest modelowaniem in sili-
co. Metody tego typu mają zastosowania m.in. w biologii, chemii, kosmologii, socjologii. 
Rzadko jednak stosuje się to podejście do modelowania problemów filozoficznych (jak 
etyka). Obecnie wydaje się ono obiecujące nie tylko dla uproszczenia rozwoju etycznych 
robotów, ale i dla głębszego wglądu w istotę filozoficznych problemów uwikłanych w kwe-
stie związane z etyką maszyn (poprzez ukazanie ich wewnętrznej struktury). Artykuł 
ukazuje również zwięzły przegląd koncepcji modelowania w kontekście historycznym, 
jak i we współczesnym.
Słowa kluczowe
modelowanie komputerowe, cyfrowa humanistyka, etyka maszyn, roboty autono-
miczne, metodologia filozofii, metodologia etyki
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Abstract
Ethics in autonomous robots as philosophy in silico:  
The study case of phronetic machine ethics
The paper explores the application of computing science to the modeling of the ethi-
cal concepts. The modeling in computers is denoted as in silico modeling. The in sili-
co method has found applications in biology, chemistry, cosmology, sociology among 
others. The applications of in silico modeling to philosophical problems (like ethics) are 
rather infrequent. Yet, the approach discussed in the paper holds the promise of not only 
facilitating the development of ethical robotics but it also may provide the insights into 
the philosophical problems themselves (by explicating their implicit structures). The pa-
per provides also a brief overview of the concept of modeling in silico in historical and 
current contexts
Keywords
computational modeling, digital humanities, machine ethics, autonomous robots, 
methodology of philosophy, methodology of ethics
